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    *The Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  03-1307
ROBERT BRESKO,
               Appellant
   v.
ROBERT JOHN, Detective,
Shamokin Police Department;
ANTHONY J. ROSINI, District
Attorney, Northumberland County
_________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: The Honorable James F. McClure, Jr.
(00-CV-1472)
_________________________
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 9, 2004
Before: BARRY and SMITH, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK, District Judge*
(Filed: January 29, 2004)
____________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________________
2SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Robert Bresko appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his claims brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Robert John, claiming false arrest in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and Northumberland County District Attorney Anthony Rosini,
asserting that Rossini violated his due process rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments by prosecuting him for a rape charge while having no reasonable belief that
the prosecution would be successful.  This is the second time this matter has been before
us on appeal.  See Bresko v. John, Nos. 00-4116, 00-4251 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2002). 
Because the facts of this case were detailed in the previous appeal, we provide only a
brief procedural history.  
I.
Bresko filed his complaint in the District Court on August 16, 2000.  At that time,
Bresko’s criminal proceeding was still pending in the state court.  The District Court
dismissed his complaint, abstaining from considering his claims against Rosini based on
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), due to the pending nature of the state criminal
prosecution.  The District Court also held that Bresko’s claims against Detective John
were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which prohibits the prosecution
of a § 1983 claim which might call into question a plaintiff’s conviction.  After the
District Court dismissed the complaint and before this Court decided the first appeal, the
District Attorney agreed to a nolle prosequi of the original charges against Bresko in
    1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3),
(a)(4).  We have jurisdiction over Bresko’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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exchange for his pleading nolo contendere to one charge of simple assault and one charge
of simple assault by physical menace.  Because Younger abstention was no longer
appropriate, and because Bresko could properly raise the argument that his criminal
prosecution was no longer called into question as barred by Heck, this Court vacated the
District Court’s dismissal in light of the conclusion of the state criminal prosecution, and
we remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the District Court determined that Bresko’s claims against Detective
John did not allege a Fourth Amendment violation and, therefore, that John was entitled
to qualified immunity.  It further held that District Attorney Rosini was entitled to
absolute immunity from Bresko’s claims because all alleged activities “were intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
409, 430 (1976).  The District Court dismissed Bresko’s amended complaint in its order
of January 6, 2003.  Bresko filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30, 2003.1
II.
In order to recover under § 1983, Bresko must show that Detective John “engaged
in conduct that deprived him of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities’ secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir.
2000).  Bresko claims that his arrest by Detective John was “pretextual, false without
4probable cause and based upon material omissions to the issuing magistrate” and thus in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.  An arrest is violative of the Fourth
Amendment where it is not supported by probable cause. Orsatti v. New Jersey State
Police, 71 F.3d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 2000).  Probable cause exists where the “facts and
circumstances [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had
committed or was committing an offense.” Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 818 (3d Cir.
1997) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)).  Additionally, where an arrest
is made pursuant to a warrant, as it was here, the plaintiff must show that “a reasonably
well-trained officer in petitioner’s position would have known that his affidavit failed to
establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for the warrant.” Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 456 (1986).  Stated another way, Bresko may show that a false
arrest took place by proving that John obtained the warrant by (1) “knowingly and
deliberately, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, ma[king] false statements or
omissions that create[d] a falsehood” when he applied for a warrant and (2) that “such
statements or omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.”
Wilson, 212 F.3d at 787.  Bresko cannot meet this standard.
The District Court appropriately determined that, taking all the allegations of the
complaint as true, Bresko failed to establish a constitutional violation by Detective John.
Detective John received information from Desiree Burns that Bresko had allegedly raped
her.  She provided a detailed statement of the alleged rape.  This was sufficient to
5establish probable cause to obtain a warrant.  Bresko does not allege that John withheld
information known to him at the time or made false statements to the issuing Judge. 
Bresko claims, however, that John should have done more investigation before applying
for the arrest warrant.  The issue “for Fourth Amendment purposes, . . . is not whether the
information on which police officers base their request for an arrest warrant resulted from
a professionally executed investigation.”  Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484.    Instead, it is simply
whether probable cause existed.  We conclude that it did.  As explained in Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), “[i]f no constitutional right would have been violated
were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning
qualified immunity.”  Because Bresko fails to establish a Constitutional violation, the
District Court properly dismissed his claim.
III.
Bresko also claims that District Attorney Rosini violated his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by initiating the rape prosecution and continuing to pursue it in the
face of a lack of evidence.  Bresko also alleges that Rosini failed to abide by an earlier
cooperation agreement despite the fact that Rosini had no reasonable expectation that
Bresko would be convicted.  The District Court appropriately determined that Rosini is
entitled to absolute immunity from Bresko’s suit.
It is well established that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from suits under §
1983 for conduct related to the initiation and presentation of the state’s case. Imbler, 424
    2 Because a written plea agreement was submitted to and approved by the
Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas, Bresko’s request for injunctive relief is
moot.
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U.S. at 431.  The decision whether to enter into a plea agreement or to pursue a trial is
strictly within the discretion of the prosecutor.  Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
273 (1993); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (plea bargaining is an essential
component of our legal system); Brooks v. George County, 84 F.3d 157, 168 (5th Cir.
1997) (decision to enter a motion of nolle prosequi entitled to absolute immunity).  Rosini
is therefore entitled to absolute immunity for his decisions regarding plea bargains.2
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Bresko’s amended
complaint against Detective John and District Attorney Rosini.
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing Opinion.
By the Court,
  /s/ D. Brooks Smith           
Circuit Judge
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